The veterans disability compensation (VDC) program, which provides a monthly stipend to disabled veterans, is the third largest American disability insurance program. Since the late 1990s, VDC growth has been driven primarily by an increase in claims from Vietnam veterans, raising concerns about costs as well as health. We use the draft lottery to study the long-term effects of Vietnam-era military service on health and work in the 2000 Census. These estimates show no significant overall effects on employment or work-related disability status, with a small effect on non-work-related disability for whites. On the other hand, estimates for white men with low earnings potential show a large negative impact on employment and a marked increase in non-work-related disability rates. The differential impact of Vietnam-era service on low-skill men cannot be explained by more combat or wartheatre exposure for the least educated, leaving the relative attractiveness of VDC for less skilled men and the work disincentives embedded in the VDC system as a likely explanation.
Introduction
The di¢ culties faced by many Afghanistan and Iraq war veterans have once again drawn attention to the fact that military service can have long-term health consequences. Care for injured and disabled veterans imposes a burden on soldiers, their families, and, in a less personal but still important way, on the government agencies that provide health care and disability insurance to veterans. These social insurance systems support almost three million sick and disabled veterans. Veterans Administration ( The most visible health concerns for veterans are the long-term consequences of combat injury. Battle…eld injuries can be individually devastating and socially costly for years after a con ‡ict ends. Fortunately, acute injuries are less common among veterans of recent con ‡icts than they were in WWII (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2006) . At the same time, an increasing fraction of veteran disability claims in the past two decades has been for chronic conditions that were not necessarily apparent on the battle…eld. These conditions include post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), hearing loss, and diabetes. Evidence for the importance of PTSD among Vietnam veterans comes in part from the pioneering draft-lottery study by Hearst, Newman, and Hulley (1986) , which showed elevated civilian suicide rates for draft-eligible men. Among Gulf War veterans, a large and growing health concern stems from a collection of symptoms with no speci…c identi…able cause known as Gulf War syndrome. The question of whether military service is indeed the root cause of these symptoms continues to be debated, but they are usually presumed to be service-connected and therefore covered by VDC. 1 The civilian re-entry experiences of each veteran cohort are in many ways unique, but there are some striking similarities. The debate over Gulf War syndrome echoes a similar controversy surrounding the rise in disability claims by Vietnam veterans-a rise that accelerated in the late 1990s and continues today. Until very recently, claims by Vietnam veterans were the source of most VDC claims growth. After 2002, this growth is partly attributable to the Veterans Bene…ts Administration's designation of diabetes as a service-related disability linked to the herbicide Agent Orange (Autor and Duggan, 2008) . 2 Perhaps surprisingly, however, much recent claims growth is due to new PTSD claims by Vietnam veterans (Rosenheck and Fontana, 2007) . The recent growth in Vietnam veterans' disability claims makes the long-term health consequences of Vietnam-era service an important contemporary policy concern.
An assessment of the link between Vietnam-era military service and long-term disability also contributes to a broader understanding of the likely health and social insurance costs of other wars. The Vietnam War lasted longer and was much more costly in terms of fatality and injury rates than more recent con ‡icts.
Consistent with this, Vietnam veterans are much more likely to receive the maximum VDC bene…t than any other cohort. We might therefore expect the health and social insurance consequences of Vietnam-era service to provide a rough upper bound on the long-term health consequences of military service for veterans of recent wars. The experiences of veterans from earlier wars provides the best available evidence on the likely consequences of military service for more recent veterans, a point made in a recent assessment of the long-run costs of the Iraq con ‡ict by Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008) .
The purpose of this paper is to provide new evidence on the long-term health impact of Vietnam-era military service. Because employment is closely associated with health, we also look at veterans' labor force status. To solve the problem of selection bias inherent in comparisons of outcomes between veterans and nonveterans, we use the draft lottery to construct instrumental variables for Vietnam-era service. Our empirical strategy relies on the 1-in-6 sample of the 2000 U.S. Decennial Census. The 2000 Census provides an exceptionally large sample and, uniquely among large representative samples, contains the birthday information required to determine draft lottery numbers. Moreover, in addition to the usual labor force status variables, the 2000 Census long form asks respondents about disabilities along a variety of dimensions, with a distinct category for disabilities that a¤ect work. Overall, our results show no causal e¤ect of Vietnamera veteran status on either work-related disabilities or employment. On the other hand, we …nd modest e¤ects on disabilities that census respondents describe as being unrelated to work.
An important feature of our analysis is an exploration of veteran e¤ects that vary with veterans'predicted wages and schooling. Recently, Black, Daniel, and Sanders (2002) , Autor and Duggan (2003) , and Duggan, Singleton, and Song (2007) have argued that high replacement rates (i.e., the ratio of disability income to prior earnings) have made Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) an increasingly attractive alternative to employment for low-skill men not yet old enough to retire.
Motivated by the possibility of similar interactions with VDC, we look for di¤erences in the impact of veteran status across quantiles of predicted wage levels and schooling. The results of this investigation show a strong interaction: although Vietnam veteran status does not reduce employment or raise work-related disability 2 The Veterans Bene…ts Administration is the part of the VA that administers VDC and other bene…t programs.
2 rates for Vietnam veterans overall, estimates for veterans with low predicted earnings show a large negative e¤ect on employment and a marked increase in disability rates (again, mostly for disabilities unrelated to work). Moreover, there is little evidence that this variation can be explained by variation in the likelihood of serving in combat or a war zone. In fact, as measured in the 1987 Survey of Veterans, the likelihood of a service-connected disability is lower for less educated Vietnam veterans. These results therefore suggest that the causal e¤ects of Vietnam-era service on employment and disability for less educated veterans re ‡ect something other than wartime injuries. A leading alternative explanation is the relative attractiveness of VDC for less skilled men and the work disincentives embedded in the VDC system.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section uses statistics on VDC and data from the CPS to identify health concerns for Vietnam veterans and to describe recent changes in their disability status and employment rates. Section 3 then discusses the descriptive statistics and …rst-stage estimates from the 2000
Census that provide a foundation for the draft-lottery-based causal analysis in Section 4. Section 3 also brie ‡y discusses the impact of Vietnam veteran status on mortality, since this is a possible source of selection bias in our analysis. Section 4 reports overall disability and employment e¤ects and e¤ects by predicted wage and schooling group. These results show important di¤erences in e¤ects across skill groups. Section 5 discusses the link between schooling and variables related to combat or war-theatre exposure and interprets the other …ndings in the paper. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
VDC and Health in the Vietnam Cohort
Veterans disability compensation (VDC) is determined by the combined disability rating (CDR), which is a function of the diagnoses for which VDC is awarded. Multiple disabilities are aggregated to produce the CDR.
Veterans with a zero percent CDR get no monthly payment but are eligible to use the VA health care system.
The largest awards go to veterans deemed to be 100 percent disabled. Veterans with a single disability rated at 60 percent or more, or a combined rating of 70 percent or more plus a single disability rated at 40 percent or more, can receive an Individual Unemployability (IU) bene…t if the Veterans Bene…ts Administration determines that they cannot work by virtue of their disabilities. An IU determination generates payments at the 100 percent CDR level. As noted by Autor and Duggan (2008) , the IU contingency generates a substantial implicit tax on the earnings of VDC awardees. 
VDC and Health Trends in the CPS
A longer view of trends in Vietnam veterans'disability status appears in Figure 1 , which shows the average amount and incidence of VA-source income. These data come from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and are described in the data appendix. The sample includes Vietnam-era and Korean-era cohorts over the 5 security disability programs). In the CPS, there is a further mechanical link between disability income and disability assessment since the CPS disability question is a screener for questions about disability income.
As we might expect given the growing importance of IU claims in the overall VDC caseload, Panel A of Figure 3 shows that the employment rate of Vietnam veterans also dipped in the late 1990s, relative to the nonveteran trend. Though employment rates should fall as the Vietnam cohort ages, the …gure shows a sharp dip relative to non-veterans the same age, after a period in which veteran and non-veteran employment rates had moved roughly in parallel. Panel B of Figure 3 shows that this relative decline is associated with a decline in self-reported health: the fraction of Vietnam veterans reporting that they quit a job or retired for health reasons ticked up sharply in 1998, and eventually pulled away from the same measure for non-veterans in the cohort. Following a brief review of related work, our main empirical analysis attempts to determine whether a causal e¤ect of Vietnam-era military service on health can explain the relative deterioration in
Vietnam veterans'self-reported health and employment rates.
Related Work on Military Service and Health
The question of how military service a¤ects civilian health is of long-standing concern to veterans and policy-makers. As noted in the introduction, one of the most controversial issues in the health arena is the proper clinical response to Gulf War Syndrome (Iversen, Chalder, and Wessely, 2007) . The growth in PTSD diagnoses among Vietnam veterans has been similarly controversial (Rosenheck and Fontana, 2007) .
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the numbers of men involved and the unique features of each era, the subject of military service and health has generated a large literature covering each service era back to WWII. A comprehensive review of these literatures is beyond the scope of our paper, but it's worth emphasizing the importance of selection bias in this context. This selection problem is highlighted by Seltzer and Jablon (1974) , which shows that WWII veterans live longer than non-veterans born in the same years, primarily due to lower death rates from conditions that would have made them ineligible for service.
A number of earlier studies use instrumental variables in an e¤ort to eliminate selection bias in estimates of the health e¤ects of military service, as we do here. Bedard and Deschenes (2006) use cohort-dummy instruments to show that military service during World War II and the Korean con ‡ict led to higher mortality from smoking-related causes, apparently because soldiers had access to free or subsidized cigarettes. On the other hand, using draft lottery instruments, Eisenberg and Rowe (2008) …nd no evidence of a lasting increase in smoking by Vietnam veterans (who did not get as large a cigarette subsidy as WWII veterans).
The pioneering study by Hearst, Newman, and Hulley (1986) presents evidence for excess suicide and motor vehicle death rates among draft-eligible men. Excess mortality from these causes might be due to PTSD.
But a re-analysis of the HNH data by Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996) is less conclusive. Similarly, also using draft-lottery instruments, Dobkin and Shabani (2006) Table 2 also shows that both white and nonwhite veterans are much more likely to report having income in a category that includes VDC. This is coded from an other income question that asks about sources of income received regularly such as veterans' (VA) payments, unemployment compensation, child support, or alimony. Since our all-male sample probably has no income 7 Other draft lottery studies include Goldberg, Richards, Andserson, and Rodin (1991), who found no evidence of increased alcohol consumption among draft-eligible men and Hearst, Buehler, Newman, and Rutherford (1991) , who found no increase in AIDS among draft-eligible men, although many Vietnam veterans stationed overseas were thought to have experimented with intravenous drugs.
8 The 1-in-6 long form sample is the basis for the publicly available PUMS …les. These …les, documented in US Census Bureau (2005) , are simple random samples drawn from the 1-in-6 …le, though the 1-in-6 …le is not a simple random sample from the census sampling frame. Rather, the Census Bureau reduces the sampling rate in more densely populated areas. Adjustment for variation in sampling rates is made here by using the weighting variables that are included in the long-form …le. These weights adjust for non-response and for non-random sampling, and are designed to match external population totals by age, race, sex and Hispanic origin. In practice, weighting matters little for our results.
9 The work-related disability questions asks: Because of a physical, mental, or emotional condition lasting 6 months or more, does this person have any di¢ culty working at a job or business? The complete set of 2000 Census disability questions appears in the data appendix. 7 from child support or alimony, and employment rates di¤er little by veteran status for whites and are higher for nonwhite veterans, the other income di¤erential by veteran status is most likely due to VDC. The same panel in Table 2 gives statistics on veterans and nonveterans with Social Security income as measured by two variables, one for Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and one for Social Security Income excluding SSI. Since Vietnam-era cohorts are too young to have retired, and are unlikely to qualify for bene…ts under the means-tested SSI program, their Social Security income is mostly from Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI). The proportion of veterans and nonveterans with Social Security income other than SSI is about 3.5 percent for whites and 6 percent for nonwhites, while the proportions receiving SSI are 1.3 percent for white veterans and 1.9 percent for white nonveterans. Nonwhite veterans are also less likely to receive SSI than nonwhite nonveterans (2.9 percent compared to 5.1 percent). Finally, we constructed an indicator for men who receive any federal transfers-either other income, Social Security income, or SSI. Not surprisingly, given the other income di¤erential, both white and nonwhite veterans are much more likely to have federal transfer income of some sort.
11 Table 2 also reports statistics for the speci…c types of disabilities identi…ed in the census. The incidence of each type of disability is slightly higher for white veterans than for white nonveterans, while the di¤erence in speci…c disability rates by veteran status is small for nonwhites. Among veterans, the most commonly reported disability is related to mobility (identi…ed in a question asking about going outside the home alone to shop or visit a doctor's o¢ ce). The second most common disability is associated with restricted physical activities such as walking, climbing stairs, reaching, lifting, or carrying. Mental disabilities are recorded in response to a question about di¢ culty learning, remembering, or concentrating. This is the third most common type of impairment.
Finally, the table shows descriptive statistics for two labor force status variables that might be related to self-reported disability status, not working (one minus employment) and not in the labor force. White veterans and non-veterans are about equally likely to be working or in the labor force. Among nonwhites, veterans work more.
1 0 Income from military disability pensions received directly from the defense department is most likely captured by another census variable that asks about retirement, survivor, or disability pensions excluding Social Security. The other income variable might also include payments received under the GI Bill, but few veterans in our cohort were likely to have still been active in GI Bill supported training. Vietnam-era GI Bill eligibility expired in 1989. The 2000 Census income questions used in our study appear in the data appendix. 1 1 Eligible claimants can receive both VDC and SSDI bene…ts without any reduction from either program; see Autor and Duggan (2008) . In 2005, about 61 percent of VDC claimants with an IU rating received SSDI (Christensen, McMahon, Schaefer, Jaditz, and Harris, 2007) . Few veterans receive SSI because SSI is means tested and because most veterans have a work history that quali…es them for the more generous SSDI program. Each lottery was associated with a draft-eligibility ceiling or cut-o¤. Men with an RSN below the ceiling were draft-eligible while men with an RSN above the ceiling were draft-exempt. The draft-eligibility ceiling was 195 in the 1970 lottery, 125 in the 1971 lottery, and 95 in the 1972 lottery. Draft eligibility is highly correlated with Vietnam-era veteran status, but the link is far from deterministic. Many men with draft lottery numbers below the ceiling were able to avoid conscription through an occupational or educational deferment, or because of poor health or low test scores, while many with lottery numbers above the ceiling volunteered for service. Throughout the Vietnam era (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) , most soldiers were volunteers.
In the sample of men born 1948-52, the e¤ect of draft eligibility on Vietnam-era veteran status is .112 for whites and .072 for nonwhites. These and other draft-eligibility e¤ects are reported in the …rst rows of Table 3 (Panel A for whites and Panel B for nonwhites). Draft-eligibility e¤ects for men born 1944-47 (not reported here) are small so we omit these cohorts.
Our primary IV strategy uses a draft-eligibility dummy as an instrument for veteran status. However, in an e¤ort to produce more e¢ cient 2SLS estimates by exploiting within-eligibility changes in the probability of enlistment, we also work with an instrument set constructed from …ve lottery-number groups and interactions of these groups with year of birth (an instrument set we call 5zx). The …rst column in each panel of Table   3 report estimates of the lottery-group …rst stage in pooled samples. 12 For example, column 1 shows that men born 1948-52 with RSNs up to 95 were .128 more likely to serve than men with RSNs above 230 (the reference group). The next group, with RSNs 96-125, was .082 more likely to serve than the reference group; the next group was .058 more likely to serve; the next group after that was .044 more likely to serve; and the last group with RSNs 196-230 was .0059 more likely to serve. All of these …rst-stage e¤ects are precisely estimated and signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. As with the draft-eligibility e¤ects, estimates of lottery group e¤ects are consistently smaller for nonwhites than for whites. F -statistics in the pooled 1948-52 sample range from 134 for nonwhites to nearly 2300 for whites. The 5zx …rst stage appears in columns 2-6 of Table 3 .
Partial F -statistics for the marginal contribution of 5zx in a model that includes lottery-group main e¤ects are on the order of 150 for whites and 10 for nonwhites. 13 
Mortality and Survivor Bias in the Census Sample
As a preliminary step, we looked for under-representation of draft-eligible men in the census sample. This analysis is motivated by the possibility that draft-eligible men were more likely to have been killed in wartime and because the link between Vietnam-era service and civilian mortality is the focus of the Hearst, Newman, and Hulley (1986) draft-lottery study of the long-term consequences of Vietnam-era service. Following the mortality investigation, which generates little evidence of an impact of Vietnam-era service on mortality, we look at the e¤ects of Vietnam-era service on self-reported disability rates and labor force status.
Mortality e¤ects are of interest both as an important health outcome and because excess mortality among draft-eligible men may induce selection bias in samples of survivors. The two most likely channels for excess mortality among draft-eligible men are war-related deaths and elevated post-service mortality.
The latter may be due to physical injury, PTSD, or other long-term consequences of military service, such as an increased likelihood of cigarette smoking (as found by Bedard and Deschenes (2006) for World War II veterans). The excess deaths in the Hearst, Newman and Hulley (1986) study are due to suicide and motor-vehicle accidents, both causes that have been linked to PTSD.
Roughly 47,000 men died as a result of hostile action in the Vietnam Era (1964-75) while 8.7 million personnel served in the military during this period for an overall casualty rate of about half a percent.
Overall casualty rates among Vietnam-era veterans were low, in part because less than half of active duty personnel served in Indochina, and because many of the men who did served in positions not exposed to combat. Although casualty rates among draftees were higher than the overall Vietnam era death rate, draftees accounted for a minority of combat deaths. It is also noteworthy that over 80 percent of combat deaths occurred before 1970. 14 It therefore seems unlikely that war-related deaths have a large e¤ect on the composition of the sample used in our study.
As a simple check on the possibility of mortality-related selection bias, we compared the actual and expected numbers of draft-eligible men in the 2000 Census by race and year of birth. The expected ratio was computed using monthly birth totals for males by race (Vital Statistics Division, 1948 -1955 , assuming birthdays (and hence lottery numbers) are uniformly distributed within a month. On the whole, draft-eligible men are represented in the census sample almost exactly as predicted, assuming a uniform distribution of lottery numbers within a month. Among whites, the predicted proportion eligible is .407, while the empirical proportion eligible is .405. Among nonwhites, the empirical proportion eligible is slightly more than predicted, .408 versus .405.
Comparisons by single year of birth for white men born 1948-53, reported in appendix Table A1 , show draft-eligible men slightly over-represented in three cohorts and slightly under-represented in the remaining three cohorts (one of these is the 1953 cohort, with no draftees). Only two cohort-speci…c di¤erences for whites are signi…cant, and all are small. Two out of six cohort-speci…c contrasts are signi…cant for nonwhites, with slightly more eligibles in the sample than predicted for nonwhites born in 1950 and 1952. Given the size and sign of this set of comparisons, it seems unlikely that di¤erential mortality by draft-eligibility status had a substantial e¤ect on the composition of the 2000 Census sample. Equally important, these results weigh against the view that Vietnam-era service led to elevated civilian mortality.
Results

E¤ects on Disability, Transfer Income, and Work
Our main focus is on the e¤ects of Vietnam-era service on self-reported disability status, disability-related transfers, and labor force status, all denoted by Y i . The empirical framework for these estimates is the equation:
where X i is a vector of controls for state, year and month of birth, and V ET i indicates Vietnam-era veteran status. We construct OLS and 2SLS estimates of this equation, the latter using the …rst stages reported in Table 3 . As noted in the introduction, veterans may have su¤ered long-term combat injuries, either physically or as a result of PTSD. Many Vietnam veterans have also been concerned about exposure to the Agent Orange defoliant used by American forces. The loss of earnings associated with Vietnam-era conscription for white veterans (documented in Angrist, 1990 ) may have also been debilitating. These health e¤ects should turn up in higher rates of disability for veterans, as captured by census self-reports. In addition, veterans may be more likely to describe themselves as disabled as a consequence of quali…cation for VDC and/or SSDI. This sort of endogenous disability reporting is discussed by Bound and Waidmann (1992) , and Benitez-Silva, Buchinsky, Chan, Cheidvasser, and Rust (2000), among others. Finally, poor health and transfer income may directly e¤ect employment, though each for di¤erent reasons, as we discuss further below.
The 2SLS estimates of e¤ects on disability outcomes in Table 4 suggest that Vietnam-era conscription induced a small increase in self-reported disability rates among whites. The estimated e¤ects, reported in columns 3-4, range from .012-.014 and are only marginally signi…cant. These e¤ects come from an increase in non-work-related disabilities; the estimated e¤ects on work-related disability rates are nearly zero. There is little evidence of an increase in disability rates for nonwhites, though the 2SLS estimates for nonwhite men, mostly negative, are imprecise. It's also worth noting that the OLS estimates show increased disability rates for whites, while those for nonwhites show a decrease. While the sign pattern of the OLS estimates is consistent with that of the 2SLS estimates, OLS estimates are especially hard to interpret in this context, since men with disabilities are typically precluded from military service.
In contrast with the modest estimated impacts on overall disability rates, Table 4 shows a marked increase in the likelihood that (both white and nonwhite) veterans receive other income (mostly VDC). The 2SLS
estimates here are around .04, which can be compared with a mean proportion receiving other income of .06-.08. At the same time, there is little evidence that Vietnam-era military service raised the proportion of men receiving income from Social Security (as noted above, Social Security income in our sample is mostly SSDI). The estimated e¤ects on Social Security income are close to zero for whites, and negative and not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero for nonwhites. The estimated e¤ects on an indicator for having any federal transfers are generally similar to the e¤ects on an indicator for other income, re ‡ecting the absence of an overall e¤ect on Social Security income and SSI (results for the latter are not shown in the table).
The largest and most consistent result coming out of an analysis of e¤ects on speci…c disabilities is an increase in the likelihood of a vision or hearing-related problem. These e¤ects, reported in panel C of Table   4 , range from .011 for whites to .039 for nonwhites, and both are statistically signi…cant at conventional levels. This increase might re ‡ect an increased incidence of hearing loss or tinnitus among veterans. On the other hand, Vietnam-era service does not appear to have worsened mental health, at least, not as re ‡ected in the rate at which men report di¢ culties learning, remembering, or concentrating. This is surprising
given the large numbers of Vietnam veterans receiving VDC for PTSD and the fact that such di¢ culties are recognized PTSD symptoms (Institute of Medicine and National Research Council, 2007) .
Although, the increased receipt of other (VDC) income documented in Table 4 is partly a mechanical phenomenon due to the fact that only veterans are eligible for VDC, the estimates showing higher non-workrelated disability rates for whites may re ‡ect a negative causal impact of military service on health. But the pattern of disability e¤ects does not seem consistent with an interpretation of the increase in disability transfers as the downstream consequence of poor veteran health. First, even if we ignore the work/nonwork distinction, the e¤ects of military service on non-work-related disability rates are too small to explain the increase in disability-related transfers. Second, the e¤ects on work-related disability are nearly zero.
Finally, the modest disability e¤ects in Table 4 do not appear to have translated into lower employment rates or reduced labor force participation, as would usually be expected for disabled workers.
The next section further explores the link between Vietnam-era military service and disability, focusing on how this link varies with measures of earnings potential.
Interactions with Predicted Wages and Schooling
The empirical literature on the unintended economic consequences of disability insurance has two themes.
The …rst is that such programs increase the likelihood of early retirement. For example, Bound and Waidmann (1992) and Stapleton and Burkhauser (2003) present evidence suggesting that disability insurance contributed signi…cantly to the drop in labor force participation of near-elderly men over the second half of the twentieth century. A second strand of this literature argues that disability insurance has become increasingly attractive for (non-elderly) low-skilled men because declining real wages for the less skilled have meant a rise in disability insurance replacement rates. In particular, Autor and Duggan (2003) …nd a close link between enrollment in SSDI and SSI and regional variation in wage levels. Black, Daniel, and Sanders (2002) similarly show that disability insurance take-up rates are highly sensitive to regional variation in labor demand.
As with Social Security disability programs, VDC may provide an attractive alternative to employment for low-wage men even if their disabling conditions are not serious enough to prevent or limit paid employment. In support of this view, Duggan, Rosenheck, and Singleton (2006) show that enrollment in the VDC program seems highly sensitive to small changes in eligibility criteria and in unemployment rates. Moreover, paralleling the incentives created by SSDI and SSI, VDC should reduce work for low-wage men through both income and substitution e¤ects. Substitution e¤ects arise because many veterans are awarded bene…ts at the 100 percent level on the basis of an IU determination that depends in part on low earnings.
We explore the link between earnings potential and disability outcomes for Vietnam veterans by looking for variation in the causal e¤ects of veteran-status across skill groups. If causal e¤ects on VDC take-up rates and self-reported disability status are driven primarily by deteriorating health, we should not expect these e¤ects to be larger for men in the lowest skill groups, unless low-skill men were also more likely to have su¤ered wartime injuries. On the other hand, if VDC is used primarily as an alternative to work for those with low earnings potential, we should see a strong gradient in the e¤ects of veteran status.
Our interacted models use predicted wages and a schooling variable to de…ne skill groups. The predicted wage is the …tted value from a regression of nonveterans' weekly wages on state of birth and education interactions, controlling for year of birth. Descriptive statistics for subsamples classi…ed by predicted wage appear in columns 4-7 of Table 2 . Not surprisingly, these statistics show that men with a lower predicted 13 wage are much more likely to be disabled and have reduced labor force attachment. In addition, we report results from an alternative speci…cation using interactions classi…ed by four schooling groups only. This provides a robustness check and generates a scheme that can be matched to our analysis of combat exposure by schooling group, described below. As it turns out, the two classi…cation schemes for interacted models produce similar results.
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The empirical framework for models with interactions is
where the variables D i1 to D i4 are either dummy variables that indicate men with a predicted wage below the 10th percentile, between the 10th and 25th percentile, between the 25th and 75th percentile, and above the 75th percentile, or indicators for four schooling groups (high school dropout, high school graduate, some college [but less than a bachelor's degree], and college graduate). The D ij V ET i terms are treated as endogenous and a set of four D ij ELIG i terms are used as excluded instruments in 2SLS estimation of a just-identi…ed model (Table 4 suggests little precision is gained in over-identi…ed models). As before, the vector of covariates, X i , contains dummies for year, month, and state of birth. The coe¢ cients of interest are 1 to 4 , the estimated causal e¤ect of Vietnam veteran status on men in each predicted wage or schooling group.
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The resulting 2SLS estimates appear in Table 5 . Column 1 in Panel A shows that for white men in the lowest wage group, the e¤ect of Vietnam veteran status on the probability of reporting any disability is .118
(the mean disability rate in this group is .4, as shown in Table 1 ). There are also much smaller, though still marginally signi…cant, e¤ects of .037 and .02 on white men with wages in the next two quantile groups, but no e¤ect on men with high earnings potential. An almost identical pattern arises when predicted wage groups are replaced by schooling groups, as can be seen in Panel B.
The overall disability e¤ects are decomposed into e¤ects on work-related and non-work-related disabilities in columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 . Consistent with a similar breakdown in the full sample, the …rst row in each panel of Table 5 shows that the large veteran e¤ect on any disability for low-skilled men is due mostly to 1 5 The sample for the predicted wage regressions consists of male US-born nonveterans born 1948-52. The dependent variable is the weekly wage and the explanatory variables are a full set of state of birth by education-group e¤ects plus year of birth main e¤ects. The education groups are: high school dropout, high school graduate, some college, and college graduate, as described in the appendix. Wage prediction regressions were run separately for whites and nonwhites. 1 6 The schooling classi…cation scheme also provide a check on selection bias from the possible endogeneity of schooling. Speci…cally, 2SLS estimates using the draft lottery (reported in Angrist and Chen, 2008) show that Vietnam-era military service increased the likelihood of college attendance but had little e¤ect on schooling at the high school level or below. Therefore, draft-lottery estimation of veteran e¤ects conditional on high school graduation status is una¤ected by any posttreatment selection bias that might contaminate contrasts by college graduation status. This in turn means that the di¤erence in treatment e¤ects between high school dropouts and the other three groups is not subject to to bias from conditioning on an outcome variable.
an e¤ect on non-work-related disabilities, with no signi…cant e¤ect on work-related disabilities in any group (though the e¤ect on work-related disabilities for men with wages in the lowest group is still substantial).
The estimated veteran impacts on both non-work and work-related disabilities are essentially zero for the highest skill group.
E¤ects on transfer income are generally somewhat larger than those on non-work-related disabilities, as can be seen in columns 4-6. Moreover, while veterans at all predicted wage levels are estimated to be more likely to have other income (VDC), the largest e¤ect is again for men with the lowest earnings potential.
The estimated e¤ects on other income in the low skill groups are .073 using predicted wages and .08 using schooling groups. The e¤ect of veteran status on the likelihood of receiving Social Security income (SSDI) is smaller than that on other income but still signi…cant for men in the lowest skill groups. This suggests that many of the men who leave the labor force to receive VDC also qualify for and receive SSDI (as argued by Autor and Duggan, 2008) .
On the other hand, the results for any federal transfers indicate that SSDI (and to a lesser extent, SSI) is a partial substitute for VDC. This is apparent from the fact that e¤ects on the aggregate transfer category are larger than the e¤ects on any single component. For example, veterans in the lowest skill group are estimated to be about 12 percentage points more likely to be receiving federal transfers, while those in the next lowest group are a little over 5 percentage points more likely to be receiving a transfer. Disabled veterans may begin receiving SSDI while they are waiting (or trying) to qualify for VDC or vice versa; the two programs have separate and independent disability determination procedures. Although SSDI is not designed to be especially attractive to veterans, all SSDI veterans who apply are required to submit their military discharge papers (form DD-214). In practice, military service increases SSDI bene…t levels and the likelihood of SSDI quali…cation for men with weak labor force attachment because time in the military generates additional earnings credits in addition to base pay.
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The last set of results in Table 5 is for the impact on employment and labor force participation. These estimates, reported in columns 7 and 8, show a marked decrease in employment and labor force participation among men in the lowest skill groups, with more muted e¤ects in the middle of the predicted wage or schooling distribution, and no e¤ect for men at the top of these distributions. The parallel between the variation in employment e¤ects across skill groups and the pattern of e¤ects on disability and transfer income is striking. Although the employment and labor force participation e¤ects are too large to be explained by the estimated e¤ects on work-related disabilities reported in column 2, they come out below the e¤ects on aggregate transfers, a point we return to in the next section.
Finally, Table 6 looks at e¤ects on speci…c disability types. Here, too, the estimated impact of Vietnam-era service is largest at the low end of the predicted wage or schooling distribution, with no signi…cant e¤ects at the high end. The largest impact at the low end is on physical disabilities, a category that probably includes most muscular and skeletal problems (e.g., related to knees or back). There appear to be smaller e¤ects on physical disabilities in the second-lowest skill group. The second largest set of veteran e¤ects relates to mental disabilities, for which there are also signi…cant impacts in the second lowest skill group.
Vision and hearing problems also appear to have been aggravated by military service among men at the low end of the skill distribution. Thus, within skill groups, the impact of military service on speci…c limitations seems broadly consistent with the diagnoses most prevalent among VDC claimants. Table 5 is whether Vietnam-era service impacts on disability, transfer income, and employment for low-skill men can be accounted for by di¤erences across skill groups in exposure to combat or the risk of service-related injury. For example, to be diagnosed with PTSD, a veteran must establish that he was exposed to traumatic events of an extreme nature (VA O¢ ce of the Inspector General, 2005, p. 46). We therefore ask whether less-educated men were more likely to be exposed to combat or war or to have su¤ered a service-connected disability. We explore this question using the 1987 Survey of Veterans (known as the SOV-III since it was the third in a series of veteran surveys). The SOV-III interviewed veterans (excluding those still on active duty) in CPS outgoing rotation groups from April 1986 through January 1987. The survey covered roughly two thousand Vietnam veterans and collected information on veterans'service experiences and health. Most relevant for us, the SOV-III included questions about service location, exposure to combat, and a direct assessment of service-connected disabilities. The data appendix describes the criteria used to select our extract, which is a subset of the sample analyzed in Angrist (1993) . Because the results in Tables 4 and 5 show signi…cant e¤ects only for whites, we focus on white men in the SOV-III.
Our empirical analysis is structured by an equation linking combat or war exposure and service-connected disabilities with schooling dummies similar to those in Panel B of Table 5. 19 Among all white Vietnam veterans in our SOV-III extract (a sample that includes men born 1943-57), 40 percent report having served in the Vietnam War theatre (Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia), 36 percent report exposure to combat, 46 percent report exposure to combat or war, and 6.1 percent report a service-connected disability. 20 To increase the sample size, our extract includes men born 1943-57, but the descriptive statistics for this sample are broadly similar to those for the draft lottery cohorts (men born 1948-52), as can be seen in the …rst rows of Panels A and B in Table 7 . One exception, however, is the low incidence of service-connected disabilities for high school dropouts in the draft lottery subsample, probably a di¤erence due to sampling variation in the smaller sample. We therefore report results for the full sample of Vietnam veterans as well as the draft lottery subsample.
The regression estimates in columns 1-4 of Table 7 are coe¢ cients on dummy variables for high school graduates, men with some college, and college graduates, relative to a high school dropout reference group.
The dependent variables are indicators for men who were stationed in the Vietnam War theatre, were exposed to combat, or were exposed to combat or war. These estimates show little di¤erence in the likelihood of exposure or service-related disability across schooling groups. For example, the mean rate of exposure to combat among high school dropouts was about .33 in the full Vietnam veteran sample (shown in Panel A, column 2), while the combat exposure rates were only 1 percentage point less for men with some college or a college degree.
Because the largest e¤ects of Vietnam veteran status on disability and employment appear among high school dropouts, the relationship between high school dropout status and exposure to war or combat is of special interest. Estimates of this relationship are reported in columns 5-7 of Table 7 , which show the e¤ects of having a high school diploma on the likelihood Vietnam veterans served in the war theatre, were exposed to combat, or were exposed to combat or war. The estimated di¤erences by schooling group are small for each dependent variable and none are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
The muted relationship between education and exposure to war or combat does not support the notion that less educated veterans were more likely to su¤er war-related trauma or injury. Table 7 show that there is no signi…cant di¤erence in the likelihood of a service-related disability across schooling groups in the full sample of Vietnam veterans. The comparison across schooling groups using data from the draft lottery cohorts (reported in Panel B) shows high school dropouts were less likely to report a service-related injury than were more educated veterans. Thus, the results in Table 7 suggest the e¤ects of Vietnam veteran status on self-reported disability and employment among less educated men in the 2000 Census cannot be explained by a higher risk of exposure to war or service-connected injury in the low education group.
The results in Table 5 also point away from health per se as the primary explanation for lower employment rates among Vietnam veterans with low earnings potential. As noted earlier, the e¤ects on work-related disabilities are too small (on the order of 4-5 percentage points) to account for employment reductions ranging from 7-12 percentage points (depending on the outcome and skill group de…nition). It therefore seems likely that part of the explanation for service-induced increases in disability rates among the low-skilled is an ex post validation of VDC or SSDI eligibility, a status administratively bound up with employment.
Speci…cally, a veteran who quali…es for a federal disability insurance program may be more likely to identify himself as disabled, even if his disability does not limit work. The strong e¤ect of Vietnam era veteran status on aggregate transfer income, reported in column 6 of Table 5 , seems like the leading proximate cause for the negative e¤ect of veteran status on employment and labor force participation rates among low skilled men.
Conclusions
Our estimates of the causal e¤ects of Vietnam-era military service on disability rates, transfer income, and employment paint a complicated picture. On one hand, there appears to have been only a small serviceinduced increase in overall disability rates among white veterans, and an insigni…cant decrease among nonwhites. Moreover, the increase among whites comes entirely from disabilities judged by census respondents to be unrelated to work. On the other hand, an analysis of e¤ects by skill groups, using either predicted wages or schooling, shows a sizeable e¤ect on disability among the least skilled white veterans, with some smaller but still signi…cant e¤ects in the lower-middle of the skill distribution. There are also large negative e¤ects on employment in the lowest skill groups.
Did the least skilled su¤er the most serious and lasting health consequences of Vietnam-era service? Our analysis points away from this interpretation. First, less educated men were not more likely to serve in the Vietnam War theatre, to be exposed to combat or war, or to have reported a service-connected disability in 1987. In addition, the estimated e¤ects of Vietnam-era veteran status on work-related disabilities are too small to explain the estimated e¤ects on employment and labor force participation. A case can therefore be made for disability insurance as a primary causal agent driving these results. Veterans who get VDC (or SSDI), especially those who are (or aspire to be) classi…ed as "individually unemployable", are probably more likely to de…ne themselves as disabled and less likely to work. This seems to be a special concern for
Vietnam-era PTSD claims; data from 2005 show that roughly one-third of PTSD claimants are designated IU and that IU claimants are concentrated in the Vietnam cohort (Christensen, et al, 2007, Figures 58-59) .
Our results have important implications for veterans compensation policy. The number of Vietnam-era VDC bene…ciaries grew rapidly in the late 1990s, growth that accelerated in the early part of this century and
has not yet leveled o¤. This imposes a growing burden on a system that must serve new cohorts of veterans from the Gulf War, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The results reported here suggest the growth in Vietnam-era disability claims (and hence costs) are not only a manifestation of the health consequences of the Vietnam war, but also a re ‡ection of the incentives embedded in our disability insurance system for veterans.
The results reported here also raise questions about widely publicized projections of the disability costs likely to come out of current con ‡icts. Speci…cally, Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008, pp. 82-83) The disability-related income variables used in Figure 1 uses the variable INCVET and a dummy for men who received veterans'disability compensation (GOTVDISA), both in 2005 dollars.. INCVET captures any income from the VA, including service-related disability payments (VDC), non-disability pension payments, 22 and educational allowances. GOTVDISA information is collected only for respondents who received veterans' payments during the previous calendar year, and it indicates whether respondents received VDC. Figure 2 was constructed from the variable DISABWRK, which codes the response to a question about disabilities that limit or prevent work. Men with fair or poor health were identi…ed using the variable HEALTH, which gives self-reported health status. This variable is available beginning in 1996.
The employment measure used in Panel A of Figure 3 is based on the CPS variable EMPSTAT, which codes as working men at work, with a job not at work, or in the armed forces. The share quitting or retiring for health reasons in Panel B is based on the CPS variable QUITSICK, which identi…es respondents who said that they had ever retired or left a job for health reasons.
All plots show weighted means collapsed by year using sampling weights ( 
Census Disability Questions
We constructed disability variables from responses to the following questions: 
Survey of Veterans (SOV-III) Sample Selection
The analysis of the SOV-III in Section 5 starts with the extract of 3,337 Vietnam and later-era veterans used by Angrist (1993) . These data are available at http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/angrist/data/ang1993.
For con…dentiality reasons, age data in the SOV-III are bracketed in 5-year intervals. The sample used in Table 7 
Schooling Group De…nitions in the 2000 Census and SOV-III
The analysis in Section 4.2 de…nes four schooling groups using the highest level of school completed (question 9 in the census). The four census schooling groups are:
1. High school dropout: the highest level completed is at most 12th grade, no diploma (response code less than or equal to 9) 
